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Abstract
This paper studies the integration strategies of multinational rms in a multi-
period model under incomplete contracts and uncertainty. I incorporate con-
tinuous levels of integration to the study of organizational choice in an existing
model of foreign direct investment (Antras and Helpman, 2004) and extend the
model to a multi-period framework of learning. The joint productivity of the two
partners in an integrated rm is unknown initially to both sides and is revealed
only after continued joint production. The model gives rise to a nondegenerate
distribution of foreign ownership at the rm level and shows that the optimal
level of integration rises with the age of the rm. These patterns are supported
by detailed plant-level data on share of foreign ownership. The model predicts
that the degree of foreign ownership is an increasing function of joint productiv-
ity and intra-rm trade should rise over time as a result of increased control by
multinationals. I test the implications of my theory with plant-level data from
Turkey and nd support for the predictions of the model.
JEL Classication: D23, F23, L23
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11 Introduction
In a comprehensive empirical and theoretical review of multinational rms, Navaretti
and Venables (2004) identify three facts about foreign direct investment (FDI) activity.
First, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) account for the dominant share of FDI 
ows;
this share increased steadily from 66.3% in the 1980s to 76.2% in the late 1990s. Second,
most FDI is concentrated in skill- and technology-intensive industries. Third, multina-
tional rms are increasingly engaged in international production networks, which gives
rise to intra-rm trade that currently takes up around one third of world trade (Antras,
2003).
The incomplete contracts setting of Antras (2003) has proved extremely useful in
explaining the recent trend in intra-rm trade and how it depends on industry-level
factor intensities. Antras and Helpman (2004) extend this approach to the integration
strategies of multinational rms but have restricted attention to two forms of sourcing
inputs abroad: complete outsourcing and complete integration. However, the preva-
lence of M&As suggests that multinationals may split ownership shares with domestic
partners every time they engage in FDI. As Desai et al. (2004) note, multinational rms
frequently have the option to own 100%, majority, or minority shares of newly created
foreign entities. In their words, \the appropriate ownership of productive enterprise
is a central issue in economic theory and a practical question for multinational rms
establishing new foreign aliates."
The choice of the degree of foreign ownership raises issues of incentives and gov-
ernance at the acquired rm. Traditional theories of FDI posit that MNEs engage
in operations abroad to exploit rm-specic (often intangible) assets. Yet, as Caves
(2007) argues: \Collaborator A in a joint venture cannot agree to reward party B
highly for B's contribution of proprietary technology to the project, without evidence
of the technology's worth." Hence, a multinational seeking to acquire a rm abroad
faces idiosyncratic uncertainty about the complementarity of its proprietary assets and
the production technologies and organization of the target rm. This uncertainty will
surely aect the multinational's choices at the acquisition stage as well as its behavior
about the delivery of its proprietary assets over time.
I refer to the variety of organizational forms that entail less than 100% ownership for
a multinational abroad as partial integration. Using detailed plant-level data from the
census of Turkish manufacturing rms over the period 1993-2001, I demonstrate three
empirical ndings. First, there is a substantial degree of partial integration among
2multinationals and their domestic partners, regardless of the industry they operate in.
Second, the average degree of foreign ownership at a multinational plant rises over time
(conditional on survival). Third, rms display substantial heterogeneity within sectors
in their factor use and productivity. These ndings motivate the theoretical model in
this paper, which incorporates partial integration into an existing model of FDI. I focus
on integration strategies by a foreign direct investor in a search and matching framework
under a setting of incomplete contracts and uncertainty. Given the long-term nature of
the investment relationship with a host country rm, I study not only a static problem
of integration, but also a dynamic problem of optimal takeover strategies.
Specically, I extend the model in Antras and Helpman (2004) to describe the opti-
mal path of integration when there is uncertainty over the quality of the match between
integrated rms. The uncertainty is modeled as the lack of sucient information on
the joint productivity of the integrated rms in the rst period of production. The
parties to the match learn about their joint productivity only after joint production
has taken place. The model delivers a nondegenerate distribution of foreign ownership
at the rm level and shows that the optimal level of integration rises with the age
of the multinational rm. Additionally, the model highlights the role of heterogeneous
rms in determining the level of integration and accounts for heterogeneity in factor use
within sectors. The driving force behind the optimal path of integration is the search
and learning framework that is built on Jovanovic (1979). This framework helps recon-
cile some potentially con
icting results concerning the direction of causation between
foreign ownership and productivity and the manner in which they interact.
In contrast to the framework of Antras and Helpman (2004), which highlights
industry-specic intensities of intermediate inputs, my major results are driven by the
joint productivity between the multinational rm and its input supplier within an indus-
try. The key comparative static of the model says that the degree of foreign ownership is
an increasing function of joint productivity. The search and matching framework, along
with this comparative static, imply that multinationals follow reservation strategies with
regard to observed productivity levels when they make their investment decisions. In
equilibrium, we only see the highly productive rms being targeted by multinationals,
and the most productive staying in a long-lasting relationship. Multinationals increase
their degree of equity participation when they nd themselves in a fruitful match, while
they divest (dissolve their match) if revealed joint productivity does not meet their ex-
pectations. This selection mechanism implies that equity investment decisions precede
physical investment decisions. Since the degree of equity participation determines the
3factor intensity of the production line, the optimal ratio of intermediate inputs by the
multinational rm to that by the supplier rises as the match endures. As such, the
model identies increased control by the multinational as the source of the transfer of
proprietary assets.
Consider Honda Turkey, which is the second European production facility of the
well-known Japanese automaker Honda. Honda Turkey represents a story of foreign
direct investment which the theoretical model developed in this paper aims to capture.1
The company was established in 1992 under the name Anadolu Honda Otomobil with a
50 percent stake controlled by each of Honda Motor Co and its Turkish business partner
Anadolu Group. Production started in 1998 and focused on serving the Turkish market
with the Civic Sedan model. Production of the Civic averaged around 7,000 until 2003,
when Honda Motor Co acquired its Turkish partner's shares in its totality and became a
fully integrated subsidiary assuming its current name. Honda Turkey started producing
a second model, City, in 2005 and started an ambitious investment project worth $100
million to increase its yearly production capacity to 50,000 in 2006. By 2008, Honda
Turkey reached its production goal of 50,000 units, 70 percent of which were destined
for export markets. While Honda Turkey imports key mechanical pieces as well as
motor and electrical components, it either produces the remaining components on-site
or sources them domestically.
The multi-period model developed here is also motivated by and able to explain
several ndings from the literature on FDI. Firstly, the most common argument in
the literature is that domestic rms that are controlled by foreign direct investors are
typically the cream (Razin and Sadka, 2007).2 Second, citing P erez-Gonz alez (2005)
and Chari et al. (2010), Razin and Sadka (2007) argue that control by multinationals
increases the eciency and value of the rm. Similarly, Lipsey and Sjoholm (2006)
suggest that higher wages observed at multinationals may be explained if a majority
foreign ownership share is required to transfer technology. Third, Barbosa and Louri
1Data related to Honda Turkey are retrieved from http://www.honda.com.tr/honda turkiye.aspx.
Similar patterns of equity and physical investment, not necessarily resulting in complete takeover,
can be found with other multinationals in Turkey. For instance, Ford Motor Company was a much
earlier entrant to the Turkish market and it assumed 11 percent of ownership in 1983 at Otosan, which
operated as the Ford assembler in Turkey. Ford increased its stake rst to 30 percent in 1987, and
later to 41 percent in 1997, and it continues production with Ford Motor Co and Otosan holding 41.04
percent each of the equity, the remainder of which is traded publicly.
2Harris and Robinson (2002) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) provide empirical evidence in
favor of\cream-skimming"in their studies of the UK and Italian manufacturing industries, respectively.
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) provide similar evidence for transition economies.
4(2002) argue that a foreign partner will demand higher ownership in case of protable
aliates and large intangible assets to be transferred. The model I present here sheds
light on these predictions by linking the investment decision of foreign investors to rm-
level productivity. Moreover, it is able to account for the intensive margin of imports
when intrarm trade occurs through vertical integration, which theory has essentially
been silent on (Corcos et al., 2010).
I test the predictions of my model using data from the census of manufacturing rms
in Turkey. After constructing plant-level estimates of total factor productivity (TFP)
to proxy match quality, I study the determinants of the degree of foreign ownership
and its relationship with productivity. I nd that match quality can explain more of
the variation in the degree of foreign ownership as compared to sectoral measures of
capital and skill intensity. This nding remains even after taking into account rm-
level heterogeneity in factor use. Moreover, I test the existence of a causal eect from
productivity to the degree of foreign ownership and nd strong evidence in favor of this
eect. My empirical analysis also documents, using nonparametric and semi-parametric
methods of survival analysis, ample evidence for the existence of a selection mechanism
that is key to the theory. In line with the model's predictions, I nd that multinational
rms with lower productivities are most likely to engage in divestment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the Turkish data
to demonstrate three empirical regularities. Sections 3 and 4 develop the static and
dynamic sides of the theoretical model, respectively. The multi-period model is able
to generate the empirical regularities identied as well as\cream-skimming." Section 5
discusses the construction of the productivity measure to be used in the econometric
analysis, lays out the econometric strategy to test the model, and presents the results
from this analysis. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Plant-Level Evidence on Extent of Integration
Plant-level data for the current study come from the Industrial Analysis Database
collected by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). TurkStat annually conducts a
census of all manufacturing establishments in Turkey with ten or more employees with
detailed information on plant characteristics such as size, wages, investment, inventories,
and value added. The database has been recently used in a study of export decision
by Ozler et al. (2009) and discussed in more detail there. Most importantly for the
current study, the database indicates whether the plant is vertically integrated with a
5multinational rm and provides a breakdown of equity ownership between the foreign
direct investor and the Turkish plant operator.3 I focus on the period 1993-2001, which
is a period of stable capital in
ows to Turkey.4 Since Turkey did not impose any
limitations on the foreign ownership of manufacturing plants in this period, I am able
to observe maximal amount of variation in the degree of foreign ownership at the plant
level and document the extent of partial integration.
Table 1 summarizes the presence of multinationals by year and sector in the sam-
ple of Turkish manufacturing plants used for the empirical analysis in this paper. I
dene a plant to be a multinational enterprise (MNE) in any given year if it has any
positive level of equity held by a foreign direct investor. In the sample, the minimum
degree of foreign ownership is 1% and the maximum degree is 100%. Panel (b) shows
that while MNEs are most prevalent in industries such as other chemicals, transport
equipment, and electrical machinery, they also operate actively in industries such as
food, wearing apparel, textiles, and non-electrical machinery.5 Hence, we observe ver-
tical integration not only in those industries that are relatively intensive in their use of
headquarter services, as predicted by Antras and Helpman (2004), but also in indus-
tries where manufactured inputs constitute the primary factor of production.6 What is
more interesting, however, is that a majority of the multinationals operating in Turkey
choose to do so in a partially integrated setting with a domestic partner, regardless of
their industry. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of foreign equity participation in the
pooled sample of plant-year observations, which points to a non-trivial distribution of
the equity share owned by multinationals. There is a sizable variation in plant-level FDI
which stretches from very low stakes in the single digits to complete integration cases.
3The database includes further information about the foreign direct investor as surveyed in the
census form. If a plant is vertically integrated, plants are asked to report the countries of the top three
shareholders and their respective shares at the plant. Since I do not focus on this further breakdown,
I simply work with the total foreign equity participation at the plant level.
4Although the period of analysis is 1993-2001, I use data starting from 1990 for plants with 25+
employees and 1991 for plants with 10+ employees to compute the capital stock series. Inclusion of
plant identication codes enables me to construct a panel and follow the plants over time. Construction
of the capital stock series and variables used in the analysis is explained in the Data Appendix, which
also describes the cleaning procedure of the data used for the analysis. Table A1 reports the number
of plants that were in the raw data before cleaning.
5In addition, multinationals are big players in their industries. Despite their small number in the
overall population of plants, multinationals have employed 381 employees on average in a year compared
to 117 in wholly owned domestic plants. This discrepancy is more pronounced in value added terms,
with MNEs creating almost ten times as much value added as domestic plants. See Table 3.
6A similar nding is reported by Corcos et al. (2010), who nd that intrarm trade and outsourcing
coexist in virtually all the manufacturing industries in their database of French multinationals, which
roughly includes one hundred industries at the NACE Rev1 3-digit level.
6In unreported gures, I nd this pattern to be fairly robust to the type of industry and
plant size. Both of the facts that vertical integration exists in all sectors and it mostly
occurs through partial integration are unaccounted for in previous theoretical models.
A more arresting picture emerges when we examine how the distribution of for-
eign equity participation changes over time. Dene the \age" of an MNE to be the
nth consecutive year that a multinational carries out joint production with a domestic
partner; for example, age 1 is the time of acquisition by the multinational with at least
1 percent equity share and the rst year that joint production takes place, age 2 is the
second year of joint production, and so on. Figure 2 shows how the extent of integra-
tion evolves with the age of the MNE.7 As joint production continues into future years,
the weight of the distribution moves to the right, suggesting that MNEs have higher
extent of integration with age. Note the drop in the fraction of MNEs under minority
foreign control and the rise in the fraction of MNEs under majority control with age. As
an alternative way to see these dynamics, I plot the mean foreign equity participation
against the age of the MNE in Figure 3.8 While average foreign equity participation
is around 52 percent at age 1, it jumps to 60 percent by age 3, and rises further to 65
percent by age 7. Hence, multinationals typically increase their equity participation at
their subsidiaries conditional on continued joint production and this adjustment mostly
occurs at the earlier ages of the MNE. These trends are again robust to type of industry
and plant size (employment).
Table 2 provides a summary of the (logs of) key variables used in the empirical analy-
sis, including their standard deviations decomposed into a between- and a within-sector
component. In line with previous evidence (see, for instance, Corcos et al. (2010)), I nd
substantial variation in productivity and factor intensities overall. More importantly,
almost all of this variation is due to rm-level heterogeneity within sectors, and not be-
tween them. Panel (a) reveals that 82.8% of the variation in TFP, 90.9% of the variation
in skill intensity, and 97.3% of the variation in capital intensity come from within-sector
dierences in the covariates, which indicate that the sector is a poor indicator of factor
7Note that the sample used to construct this gure includes those MNEs that would be classied
as\greeneld FDI,"i.e. plants which have always had 100 percent foreign equity participation. Hence
the abundance of observations at the far right end of the distribution. These MNEs are included in the
gure to give an idea about how the prevalence of partial integration compares to the case of complete
integration. In the sample, only around 25% of all MNEs are fully integrated.
8In the gure, predicted foreign equity participation is a univariate fractional-polynomial estimate.
I exclude greeneld FDI plants when constructing Figure 3, as these plants typically do not show any
variation in their degree of foreign ownership. Inclusion of these plants does not change the main point
of Figure 3, but makes the jump from age 1 to age 2 less pronounced.
7intensities. These gures are slightly higher than the ones reported for the French data
by Corcos et al. (2010), and they support the authors' observation that the rm is the
correct unit of analysis in order to study the determinants of internalization identied
by the theory.
There are three empirical regularities that emerge from the Turkish data. First,
the majority of multinationals operate in a partially integrated setting with a domestic
partner regardless of industry characteristics, which implies that partial integration is a
more prevalent form of foreign direct investment than complete integration. Moreover,
there is signicant heterogeneity in the degree of integration among MNEs. Second, the
average share of ownership by foreign direct investors increases over time conditional on
continued joint production. This suggests that multinationals follow a dynamic policy
of integrating with their supplier and choose high levels of equity participation if they
nd themselves in a long lasting contractual relationship. This pattern could also arise
if more highly integrated rms are more likely to survive. Lastly, there is signicant
within-sector heterogeneity; the variation in productivity and factor intensities across
rms cannot be explained by sector-specic characteristics.
3 Optimal Integration
In this section, I modify the model in Antras and Helpman (2004), henceforth AH, to
incorporate partial integration to the study of foreign direct investment.
There are two countries, North and South, and a unique factor of production, labor.
Preferences are as in AH, so that the world population consists of a unit measure of
consumers with identical preferences given by:







j ; 0 <  < 1;
where x0 represents consumption of a homogeneous good,  is a parameter, and aggre-
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of the consumption of dierent varieties xj(i). I retain the AH assumption that varieties
within a sector are more substitutable for each other than they are for x0 or for varieties
from a dierent sector; i.e.  > . These preferences imply that nal goods producers





There is a perfectly elastic supply of labor in each country, and wages are given by
wN and wS in the North and the South, respectively. Assume wN > wS. Output is
produced using a combination of two inputs that are specic to the variety, hj(i) and
mj(i), where the headquarter services input hj(i) can be produced only in the North.
The manufactured components mj(i) can be produced in either country. Essentially,
however, every nal good producer needs to contract with a manufacturing plant oper-
ator for the provision of the variety-specic components (Antras and Helpman, 2004).
This means that an input which is crafted to be used in a certain variety has no valuable










; 0 < j < 1; (2)
where  is a match-specic productivity parameter that is unknown to both the nal
good producer and the manufacturing supplier at the time of the match.9 The param-
eter, j, controls the headquarter intensity of the production and is sector-specic.
A major assumption built into the model is that there exists a nondegenerate distri-
bution of productivities for a nal good producer across dierent suppliers. I interpret
 as a measure of how complementary the two sides to the match are and as re
ecting
the cost-saving advantages to the nal good producer of monitoring and supervising
the supplier. This will show variation across suppliers due to plant-specic factors such
as location, industry, organizational form, or skill composition. The match-specic
productivity is unknown in the rst period and is revealed to both sides only after con-
tinued joint production in the second period. As in Jovanovic (1979),  is distributed
independently across suppliers, which means that the\informational capital"generated
through joint production is completely match-specic. Hence, the nal good producer's
previous experience with other suppliers carries no information about its productivity
with new suppliers.
The distribution of  in the population is known and I follow the common assumption
regarding rm productivities: i.e.   Pareto(b; 
), where b > 0 is the scale parameter
9Note that the match-specic parameter should in fact be denoted as i; I drop the subscript to
simplify notation.
9and 
 > 2 is the shape parameter.10 Accordingly, the cdf is given by:
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In order to draw the match-specic parameter with a manufacturing supplier, the
nal good producer pays a xed cost of entry wNfE. Upon payment of this xed cost,
the nal good producer matches with a supplier with probability one and receives a
noisy signal about the true value of its joint productivity with its supplier. If the
match persists, the nal good producer decides on the organizational form of the match
(\the rm"), which determines the additional xed organizational costs to be incurred.
Following AH, I interpret the xed organizational costs as the sum of all costs that
pertain to the search for a supplier in the South and to the management of the rm,
which entails \supervision, quality control, accounting, and marketing" among other
things.
I assume in addition that the xed organizational costs are increasing in the nal
good producer's ownership share. This assumption re
ects the idea, for instance, that
a multinational rm may be required to hire a larger team of management and devote
more time to establish a rm in which it has majority share. Due to economies of
scale in operation, however, a multinational may not incur as high xed costs once it
achieves eective control of the rm. Hence, the xed organizational costs are denoted
as wN, where  2 (0; 1) is the share of the multinational at the rm and  2 (0; 1) is
an exogenous parameter.
I focus specically on vertical integration as the organizational form of the rm in
this paper. I assume that the multinational has already made its decision to obtain
the manufactured input from a vertically integrated supplier in the South; i.e. foreign
direct investment. AH establish that there always exist high productivity nal good
producers that choose to acquire manufactured inputs via FDI. The crucial question
I ask is: where does the multinational draw its boundaries in controlling/owning the
manufacturing plant operator in any given period? In other words, is there an optimal
level of integration,  2 (0; 1), for each period given the multinational's characteristics?
I adopt the incomplete contracts setting due to Antras (2003), where ownership of
the suppliers entitles nal good producers to some residual rights of control. Following
the property-rights approach to the boundaries of the rm, input suppliers and nal
good producers cannot sign enforceable contracts specifying the purchase of a certain
10
 > 2 is required for the distribution to have nite variance.
10type of intermediate input for a certain price (Antras, 2003). As such, the division of
the rm's revenue is determined by an ex post bargaining procedure following the pro-
duction of the inputs. As in AH, ex post bargaining takes place under all organizational
forms and is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game over potential revenue,
which is given by:




In the Nash bargaining procedure, the outside option of the manufacturing supplier
is always zero since its input is completely variety-specic. The nal good producer's
outside option, however, depends positively on the share of the rm it controls. Speci-
cally,  determines the fraction of the manufactured input that the nal good producer
has residual rights over. In the ex post bargaining, the nal good producer can seize
its share of the manufactured input, , once production has already taken place, and
sell an amount x(i).11 This translates into a fraction  of the revenue if the nal
good producer carries out production on its own. Let  2 (0; 1) denote the fraction
of the ex post gains from entering a production relationship that go to the nal good
producer. Given this denition of residual rights, the share of the revenue that the nal
good producer captures is given by V =  +(1 ) as a result of generalized Nash
bargaining, which re
ects the nal good producer's outside option plus its share of ex
post gains. The share of the revenue for the manufacturing supplier is (1   )(1   ),
or equivalently, 1   V.
The nal element of the model is an upfront payment in each period by the man-
ufacturing supplier to participate in the match. The upfront payment could be either
positive or negative and is included in the contract that is oered to the potential
supplier by the multinational. The contract oer follows the decision for the level of
integration. As in AH, I assume an innitely elastic supply of manufacturing suppliers
so that their prots from the relationship inclusive of the upfront payment are equal to
their ex ante outside option, which is set to zero for simplicity.
The time line of the model is as follows:
1. Period 1 starts. The nal good producer enters the industry and pays the xed
cost of entry, wNfE.
2. At the same time, an unmatched supplier of manufactured inputs and the nal
good producer form a pair and jointly draw a random match parameter  from
11Note that restricting  to be strictly less than one ensures that the supplier chooses to produce a
positive amount of the manufactured input in each period.
11a known distribution with cumulative distribution function Probf  sg = G(s).
The value of  is unknown to both sides of the match at this point.
3. After the match is formed, the nal good producer and the supplier receive a
signal y, which is a random draw from the uniform distribution over the range
(0; ].12 13 Following the realization of the noisy signal, the nal good producer
may choose to exit the match or oer a contract to the supplier. If the nal good
producer leaves, it can seek out a new supplier, draw a new match parameter, 0,
and receive a noisy signal on it, y0, the next period.
4. If the nal good producer stays, it negotiates a multi-period contract with the
supplier. The contract sets forth the share of the rm that the multinational will
own this period, 1, with the understanding that this can be updated when the
uncertainty is resolved. The contract also species an upfront payment, t, that is
to be paid by the supplier for each period that the match survives and that can
be updated. Note that t could be positive or negative and the supplier has an
outside option of zero in each period.
5. If the parties to the match cannot reach an agreement, the match breaks up.
The nal good producer can then seek out a new supplier and draw a new match
parameter, 0, in the next period. If the multi-period contract is accepted, the
match survives into the next period.
6. Upon acceptance of the contract, the nal good producer acquires its optimal
stake, 1, as specied in the contract. The nal good producer and the supplier
then independently choose their quantities, h and m respectively, to maximize
their own payos.
7. Output for the rst period is sold and the resulting revenue is divided following
a generalized Nash bargaining procedure. Period 1 ends.
8. Period 2 starts. In the case of survival, the true value of  is revealed to both sides
of the match as a result of continued joint production. The nal good producer
12I let the signal be a random draw from the uniform distribution for purposes of tractability. In
particular, this setup yields the Pareto distribution to be\conjugate"; that is, the posterior distribution
of the parameter of interest belongs to the same family as the prior distribution. The model could be
easily extended to the case where the signals are also distributed Pareto - in this case, the posterior
distribution will belong to the Gamma family of distributions when the shape parameter is unknown,
and to the Pareto family when the scale parameter is unknown.
13Notice that the lower boundary on the range of the signal is known, while the upper boundary
is not. One can also imagine a case where the lower boundary is unknown as well, e.g. some range
[1; 2]. This could be handled similarly where the prior joint distribution of 1 and 2 are bilateral
bivariate Pareto, which gives rise to a posterior joint distribution in the same family of distributions.
12has the option to terminate the contract at this point or update it. If the multi-
period contract is updated, the nal good producer picks its optimal stake this
period, 2, which will apply in all subsequent periods as well.
9. The nal good producer and the supplier choose their quantities noncooperatively
to maximize their own payos.
10. Output for this period is sold and the resulting revenue is shared following a
generalized Nash bargaining procedure. Period 2 ends.
The current model can characterize what happens to the likelihood of divestment over
time (i.e. a break up of the match) endogenously. It is still of interest, however, to
study an exogenous impact that may dissolve a match, which ensures that there exists
a set of domestic suppliers that remain unmatched in each period. I assume that a
rm in production is subject to adverse liquidity shocks with the hazard of separation
occurring at the exogenous rate . Once joint production starts, the rm could receive
a liquidity shock in any of the future periods.
Before describing the equilibrium under uncertainty, I study the per-period problem
that the nal good producer and the manufacturing supplier face. In the case that












where I have dropped the subscript, j, to focus attention on a single industry. In the
case of disagreement, the outside option of the supplier remains zero but that of the
nal good producer depends on its share of the rm, .
Following the nal good producer's choice of  in each period, the parties to the
match independently choose the quantities of their inputs. Given the noncontractibility
of the supply of inputs, each input supplier maximizes its own payo. The nal good
producer's problem is to pick the amount of headquarter services to maximize VR(i) 
wNh(i), and the manufacturing supplier's problem is to pick the amount of intermediate
inputs to maximize (1  V)R(i) wSm(i). Substituting the expression in (3) for R(i)






































ect the optimal decisions of the sides to the match after uncer-
tainty is resolved; that is, at stage 9 of the game. When the input suppliers are making
their input decisions prior to the resolution of the uncertainty, at stage 6, they will be
picking their quantities conditional on the information that they receive about the true
joint productivity. The optimal quantities under uncertainty are then given by the rst
order conditions to each supplier's program, which maximize own per-period expected
payos. Since both input suppliers are assumed to update their beliefs about  in a
Bayesian fashion, the expected payos substitute E[jy] in place of  in (3).
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since V = (1 )+. Notice that taking headquarter intensity and wages as xed,
h(i)=m(i) depends only on . Hence, the model generates within-sector heterogeneity
in factor use due to the level of integration. The optimal intensity of headquarter
services is independent of  due to the symmetry between the two input suppliers'
(lack of) information about  in each period. In the rst period, they both observe
the same signal, y, which returns the same conditional expectation about , while in
the second period, the true value of  is revealed to both sides. This informational
symmetry prevents the sides to the match from learning more about  through each
other's input choices. Given this, the nal good producer's optimal level of integration
will be changing as the rm endures to the extent that it is aected by the resolution
of the uncertainty. In particular, the production line will be getting more intensive in
the use of headquarter services if  increases following the removal of uncertainty in
equilibrium. I show this result in the next section.
Using the rst order conditions in (4) and (5) along with (3) gives the total per-
period value of the rm as measured by total operating prots:
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V = 
(1   ) + 
and wN re
ects the (per-period) xed costs of integration. Recall that  >  is a
14parameter that describes the marginal xed cost of acquiring an ownership stake at the
rm. I assume that this marginal xed cost decreases with the level of integration as
the nal good producer is required to commit a greater amount of resources initially to
take control of the rm. Accordingly,  2 (0; 1). Prots are strictly increasing in  and
strictly decreasing in wN and wS as expected.
Following AH, I consider an industry with high headquarter intensity  such that
operating prots excluding organizational costs are increasing in the nal good pro-
ducer's share of the revenue.14 This setup highlights the importance of the input by
the nal good producer and lays the basis for the observation that most foreign direct
investment takes place in high technology intensive industries. Since I focus speci-
cally on vertical integration in the South, this is equivalent to the setup in AH where
 (V; ) is increasing in V regardless of where production takes place. The intuition
here is that in a high headquarter intensity sector,\the marginal product of headquar-
ter services is high, making underinvestment in h(i) especially costly and integration
especially attractive" (Antras and Helpman, 2004).
In solving any given period's subgame, the upfront payment specied in the multi-
period contract, t, ensures that the nal good producer eectively maximizes the total
value of the rm in every period.15 Given the structure of the prots in the stage game,
is there an optimal level of integration  that maximizes (7)? Moreover, is  unique?
This is the question that the nal good producer needs to answer at stage 8 of the game
after both parties to the match learn the true value of  (the same question needs to be
answered also in the rst period at stage 6, when  is still unknown). It is equivalent to
asking whether the rm's operating prots, (7), are concave in ; for if not, then the
optimal level of integration happens either at extremes (e.g. in the case of linearity) or
at multiple points.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique optimal value for the level of integration,  2
(0; 1), that maximizes the total operating prots of the multinational rm at the
stage game.
Figure 4, panel (a), shows the relationship between the rm's operating prots and
its degree of integration for various values of headquarter intensity. Firstly, the optimal
level of integration lies strictly away from the end points for a range of headquarter
14Where deemed useful, I comment on how the model can accommodate low headquarter intensity
sectors (see, for example, the proof of Proposition 1) and provide intuition for comparison purposes.
15See Antras and Helpman (2004) for a proof of this assertion.
15intensities. For dierent values of , prots are maximized at an intermediate level
of integration. Secondly, notice that the optimal level of integration is increasing in
. For industries that are relatively more intensive in the use of headquarter services
(i.e.  > 0:5), both the optimal integration level and the absolute level of prots are
rising in .16 The reason for this lies at the heart of the hold-up problem, whereby a
larger share of the manufactured input's ownership should be given to the side whose
investment has greater impact on the joint surplus, following the optimal allocation
of property rights. In high  industries, the marginal product of the input from the
headquarters is much greater than that of the input from the manufacturing supplier.
Therefore, the underinvestment in the manufactured input that is caused by a higher
degree of integration is more than oset by the rise in total revenues driven by increased
employment of headquarter services. Consequently, the share of the revenue that the
nal good producer captures from the relationship is increasing in the intensity of
headquarter services. I refer to this dependence of the optimal degree of integration on
 as the \Antras eect."
A second important result from the stage game concerns how  changes with match-
specic productivity. As seen from (3), the revenues of the rm are strictly increasing
in . Given a higher level of productivity, a nal good producer is inclined towards
capturing a greater share of the revenue. However, this decreases the share that is left
to the manufacturing supplier, causing underinvestment in the manufactured input.
The downward pressure on the revenue level caused by the supplier's underinvestment
can potentially outweigh the gains from a productivity increase. Yet, in an industry
with high headquarter intensity, the marginal product of the manufacturing input is
relatively low. This enables the nal good producer to choose a higher stake at the rm
without distorting the incentives of its supplier by too much.
Proposition 2 The optimal level of integration is increasing in the match-specic pro-
ductivity level; that is, @()=@ > 0.
I refer to this dependence of the optimal degree of integration on  as the \match
quality eect." Figure 4, panel (b), relates operating prots to  for a range of joint pro-
ductivities in the same industry. While the Antras eect highlights the role that sector-
16Notice that the absolute level of prots for  = 0:35 is actually higher than that for  = 0:5.
The upper envelope of operating prots as a function of  seems to be U-shaped, with the bottom of
the U being reached at an intermediate level of . This is because the hold-up problem in physical
investments is most severe when both sides to the match make large contributions.
16specic headquarter intensity plays in determining , the match quality eect empha-
sizes within-sector heterogeneity along joint productivities. Given a non-degenerate
distribution of , the stage games produce a non-degenerate distribution of  among
the MNEs. Producers show variation in their level of integration not only along head-
quarter intensity, but also their joint productivities within similar industries. Which
one of these eects is more instrumental in determining  is essentially an empirical
question. Another important implication of Proposition 2 is that the optimal ratio of
investments in headquarter services and manufacturing inputs, given by(6), is higher
for those MNEs with a higher match quality in any given industry. Within-sector het-
erogeneity in productivity translates into factor intensity heterogeneity for the MNEs
due to the variation in their optimal degree of foreign ownership.
4 Equilibrium under Uncertainty
In serving a host country market, the multinational seeks to maximize the expected
present value of its prots. Given the structure of the multi-period contract, this will be
equivalent to maximizing the total prot stream of the whole relationship (the integrated
rm) associated with a match. The problem for the multinational is to determine the
optimal path of integration with a manufacturing supplier to achieve this goal. This
includes the option that the nal good producer might withdraw from the partnership
in order to seek a new match at any period in the relationship. I solve the problem by
working backward, starting in period 2.17
From stage 8 on, the nal good producer knows the true value of , which will be
its joint productivity with the supplier in this and all future periods. Let J() denote
the expected present value of prots to a rm who has a known match quality  and
is behaving optimally. Note that having realized its true productivity, the nal good
producer could calculate its optimal level of investment, 
2, and stipulate this level in
the contract to be updated. Therefore,  is a sucient statistic for the rm's expected
present value at any period in time, which allows me to write the value function in
terms of  only.
Let r be the rm's discount rate. If the contract is updated, then the value of the
17The solution concept here is similar to the discussion in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), who work
with a simplied version of Jovanovic's model in its original context of labor markets. I also work with
a simple discrete time version of Jovanovic's model; however, the current model diers signicantly
from the original in certain respects, such as its contracting structure and probability distributions.
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is the per-period prot of the rm at the outcome of the stage game in period 2. Recall
that  is the exogenously given separation rate due to adverse liquidity shocks.
If the contract is terminated, no production will take place this period as the nal
good producer would have no provision of the manufactured inputs. The nal good
producer could then start searching for a new manufacturing input supplier next period
and draw a new match parameter. Let Q be the present value of prots of a nal good
producer who withdraws from a match and behaves optimally. Since the search for a
new supplier involves drawing a new value of  independent of the previous matches, Q
will be a constant under the assumptions of an innite horizon and constant discount
rate (Jovanovic, 1979).19
The Bellman equation that characterizes the value of the game to the nal good
producer in period 2 is then given by: J() = maxf() + 1
r+J(); 1
rQg. I depict this
equation in Figure 5. The value of continued joint production is rising in the match
parameter while the value of withdrawal is constant. As is clear from the gure, the
optimal policy is one that updates the contract for values of  above a certain level and
terminates it below this threshold level. The solution to the Bellman equation in period






r+J() for   
1
rQ for   
(10)
where the threshold level  satises:20
r + 





The nal good producer's optimal policy in period 2 implies that, in equilibrium,
only those matches that have high enough productivities will continue joint produc-
tion in future periods. If the true value of  is revealed to be below , the rm will
be dissolved since continuing the relationship indenitely at a low  yields a lower ex-
18I suppress the other arguments of the per-period prot function for notational simplicity.
19In the current model, the constancy of Q implies that if a nal good producer withdraws from a
match with a supplier, it will never choose to carry out joint production with this particular supplier
in the future.
20Notice that (10) implies J() = r+
r+ 1() for   .
18pected present value of prots than the alternative matches. This aspect of the model
can explain the often mentioned case of \cherry-picking" in foreign direct investment,
whereby multinational rms invest only in the high productivity plants in the host
economy. Since the multinational can sample from a large pool of potential suppliers
and it locks itself in a relationship with the same supplier, its optimal policy is to wait
until it nds itself in a match with high enough productivity. In equilibrium, only
those multinationals that realize a certain threshold level of productivity persist in the
industry.
The multinational's optimal policy in period 2 implies that matches break up only
between the rst and second periods. If the multinational decides to remain in the
relationship in period 2, then it will continue joint production indenitely. Hence,
divestment is negatively correlated with the age of the multinational and the model
reproduces the empirical observation that most plant closures by multinationals occur
in the early stages of the partnership.
Given the optimal policy of contract updating in period 2, I now turn to the nal
good producer's decision making in period 1 in the presence of uncertainty. Having
received a noisy signal on the match parameter, y, the nal good producer follows
Bayesian updating to calculate the posterior probability distribution of . The following
lemma describes the properties of the posterior distribution.
Lemma 1: Let y denote a random draw from a uniform distribution over the range
(0; ]. The Pareto(b; 









+1 if   b
0 otherwise
where b > 0 and 
 > 2. Let ~ 
 = 
 + 1 and ~ b = max(y; b). The posterior density







+1 if   ~ b
0 otherwise
which takes the same form as the prior. Hence jy is Pareto(~ 

















Proof: See Leonard and Hsu (1999).
19Lemma 1 expresses the posterior expected value of  in terms of the parameters of the
distribution and the signal. In order for the signal to be informative about , I assume
for the remaining analysis that the lower bound for the signal is b, so that ~ b = y.21 This
setup leads the rm to infer that the true value of its  is increasing in the value of the





that since y is uniformly distributed, the posterior mean is also distributed uniformly,
characterized by the parameters ^ b and ^ 









 1.22 I denote the
distribution of the posterior mean by G(~ j^ 
; ^ b).
Let V (~ ) be the value to a nal good producer who has received signal y and is
behaving optimally in period 1. If the nal good producer chooses to remain in the
match, the outcome of the game in period 1 yields a per-period prot of (~ ), where23
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In the case that the match breaks up, the nal good producer receives a per-period
prot of zero and it can seek out a new supplier next period. If it survives, the true
value of  is revealed. Then V (~ ) satises:















In (13), P(0j~ 
; ~ b) is the conditional distribution of joint productivities for the next
period when the true  is revealed. As with the contract updating policy in period 2,
(13) implies an optimal policy for the nal good producer that continues the match
above a certain level of ~ , and withdraws from it below this threshold.24 The solution
to the Bellman equation for the rst period is given by:








; ~ b) for ~   ~ 
1
rQ for ~   ~ 
(14)
21One can interpret this by assuming, for instance, that the rm receives a signal above a certain
value in expectation of the productivity gains from a takeover. Note that when y < b, the posterior
mean becomes ~ 
b=(~ 
  1), which is independent of y, and therefore the signal becomes uninformative.
22The support of a uniform distribution is dened by its upper and lower bounds.
23The following equations are written with some abuse of notation. Notice that equation (12) is






, which is not the same as ~  = E(jy). To be more precise,
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=(1 )y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) by using the density function f() in Lemma 1.






is determined by ~ 
 and y. Likewise, taking  as given, the
distribution of the posterior expectation is uniform and characterized by similar parameters.




; ~ b) are increasing in ~  while 1
rQ is
constant.












It is possible to show (see Appendix) that () > (~ ); that is, the nal good
producer requires a higher level of prots in period 2 to stay in the match compared to
the level of prots it would accept in period 1 to continue joint production. The reason
for the increase in the\reservation prots"is the resolution of the uncertainty over the
joint productivity parameter. Since the nal good producer knows that the rm's total
prots will be determined by the true value of  in period 2 and thereafter, it becomes
more selective in establishing a long-term relationship with a supplier. An immediate
implication of this result is that  > ~ , because the per-period prot function (:) is
strictly increasing in . Therefore, the nal good producer's optimal policy implies
divestment whenever the true productivity level with the supplier turns out to be lower
than the threshold value of the posterior mean.
The increase in the reservation productivity level of the nal good producer explains
the argument that foreign direct investors tend to retain high-productivity rms under
their ownership and sell low-productivity rms to uninformed agents since they gain
crucial information about the productivity of the rms under their control (Loungani
and Razin, 2001). Note, however, that in order to gain this crucial information, the
nal good producer should commit to at least one period of joint production with
its supplier. What happens following this learning stage is a selection process which
eliminates low quality matches. As a result, multinational producers lie at the high end
of the productivity distribution for a universe of plants in host economies.25
I now study whether there exists a unique solution to the nal good producer's
dynamic problem. The nal good producer's optimal policy consists of a threshold
strategy in each of the two periods of the model. If the nal good producer leaves the
match at any of these periods, it can match with a new supplier and receive a noisy
signal on its joint productivity with the new partner. The expected present value from
a new match is given by:
Q =

V (~ )dG(~ j^ 
; ^ b) (16)
The nal good producer's optimal policy is characterized by the equations (10),
25This mechanism implies a lemons problem in the market for corporate stocks when foreign owners
are divesting. It would not be surprising to see a decline in the value of a rm when corporate control
is handed from foreign owners back to the initial owners of the rm.
21(14), and (16), which give rise to a single Bellman equation in V :






























The following result establishes the solution to the nal good producer's dynamic
problem and is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique, bounded, and continuous solution for V in (17).
What does the learning process imply about the optimal level of integration? Recall
that the nal good producer designs a multi-period contract in period 1 (stage 4) which
species its share of the manufactured input in the rst period and gives the right to
update this share when the uncertainty is resolved (stage 8). I am interested in how
this share evolves as the match endures. Within the property-rights framework of the
multinational rm, I expect the resolution of the uncertainty to lead to a more ecient
allocation of residual rights as joint production reveals the optimal mix of headquarter
services and manufactured inputs. The multi-period contract should be updated to
re
ect this allocation of rights over the manufactured input.
Consider a nal good producer in period 1 that has received a signal such that its
posterior expected value of , say ~ t, lies between  and ~ . In equilibrium, this marginal
producer will start production with its supplier in the rst period but it will divest and
withdraw from its match if the true value of its  eventually turns out to be less than .
For the producer to survive with its current match into future periods, its true  should
turn out to be greater than  > ~ t. This implies that the true joint productivity with
the supplier should surpass the posterior expected value, which is calculated from the
signal, for surviving rms. Recalling the earlier result that @()=@ > 0, the marginal
producer will increase its optimal level of integration with the supplier in the case that
the match survives. It is then intuitive to see the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The optimal level of integration for an average rm in its second period
is higher than the level of optimal integration for an average rm in its rst period.
In other words, the optimal degree of foreign ownership is rising over time for an
average multinational.
22Proposition 3 explains the empirical regularity demonstrated in Section 2 that for-
eign equity participation rises with the age of the MNE. The intuition is fairly straight-
forward and depends on the selection of high productivity matches into future periods.
Low productivity matches dissolve if the true value of their  is not higher than their
posterior mean. High productivity matches survive into the second period and the
multi-period contract is updated to re
ect the revelation of the true value of produc-
tivity. This selection mechanism leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The optimal ratio of investments in headquarter services and manu-
factured inputs, h=m, rises with the age of the integrated rm.
Proposition 4 is relatively easy to see from equation (6). Notice that (6) depends only
on , and positively. Since the optimal level of integration is increasing over time for an
average multinational, we immediately have that h=m is higher in the second period
than in the rst period. Hence, the model predicts that production gets more intensive
in the use of headquarter services as the integrated rm continues production in future
periods. In the second period, there is a greater transfer of headquarter services that
are produced in the North to the production plant in the South. Therefore, the model
generates transfer of technology that is driven by the degree of foreign ownership and
explains the empirical nding that multinational plants get more headquarter-intensive
over time.26
The inner workings of the dynamic model essentially depend on a selection mecha-
nism whereby low productivity matches dissolve as the uncertainty over match quality
is resolved. This selection mechanism determines the rise in the threshold levels of joint
productivity from period 1 to period 2 and leads to the optimal reallocation of property
rights within the rm. According to the model, the probability of a match being dis-
solved in period 2 is given by Probf0 < j~ g = P(j~ 
; ~ b), which is obviously negatively
correlated with ~ , the posterior expected value for joint productivity. I summarize this
selection mechanism in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The probability of a match being dissolved subsequently is negatively
correlated with the current level of joint productivity.
26See, for instance, the discussion in Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for how factor intensity and use of
imported inputs evolves at multinationals over time.
23The dynamic model can thus explain the major empirical regularities identied in
Section 2 in addition to a set of well-known facts in the literature. It also presents
some strong implications about the evolution of the degree of foreign ownership and
productivity and how they interact. I turn next to a rigorous empirical analysis of this
interaction.
5 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model described previously delivers some testable implications about the
relationship between the level of foreign ownership and the joint productivity (\match
quality") of the multinational parent and the manufacturing supplier. In order to test
the implications of the model, I measure joint productivity at the MNE by total factor
productivity (TFP). This section rst discusses the construction of the joint produc-
tivity measure and then lays out the econometric strategy to test the model alongside
presenting my ndings using plant-level data from Turkish manufacturing industry.
5.1 Estimating Joint Productivity









; 0 < j < 1;
where  indicates joint productivity, hj(i) is the headquarter services input that is
imported from the North, and mj(i) is the manufactured component at the plant in the
South. Unarguably, both the headquarter rm and the manufacturing supplier employ
physical capital, labor, and some intermediate inputs to provide h and m. While I do
not observe the quantities and inputs that are used in the production of h, I do observe
the inputs used by the supplier rm to produce m. More specically, I assume that m










where k represents physical capital, l represents labor, n represents raw material in-















24which suggests the following specication of the Cobb-Douglas production function in
logs:
logxj(i) = 0+1loghj(i)+2logkj(i)+3loglj(i)+4lognj(i)+5logej(i)+log+"j(i)
where log is the productivity shock that is observed by the producer but not by
the econometrician, and " are unobservable shocks to eciency. Productivity shocks
log are assumed to follow a rst-order Markov process. Since I cannot dierentiate
between h and n in my data set, I choose to follow a value-added estimation approach.
Letting vj(i) represent value added, i.e. gross output net of both imported and domestic
intermediate inputs, I can write the production function as:
logvj(i) = 0 + klogkj(i) + lloglj(i) + log + " (19)
The parameters of the value-added equation (19) are consistently estimated using
the two-step procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and predicted levels
of productivity are recovered from:
^  = exp(logv   ^ klogk   ^ llogl)
The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure relies on rms' intermediate inputs to
proxy for productivity shocks that are correlated with rms' inputs of production. In
my estimations, I use raw materials to proxy productivity shocks in order to satisfy the
monotonicity condition.27 I estimate the parameters of (19) at the ISIC Rev. 2 three
digit industry level; coecient estimates are reported in Table A3.28
Table 2 reports the mean values of some key variables used in the empirical analysis
by type of ownership and year. The average TFP value for the multinationals is more
than twice that for domestic plants in most of the years in the sample. The average
TFP at multinationals throughout the sample period is around 5.3 compared to 1.3 at
domestic plants, a dierence that is statistically signicant. This nding conrms the
model's prediction that, in equilibrium, only the most productive plants are controlled
27An alternative methodology for TFP calculation is Olley and Pakes (1996), who suggest using
investment decisions to proxy productivity shocks. However, there is a large number of zero obser-
vations for the investment series in the Turkish data, as can be seen from Table A2, which reports
the percentage of non-zero observations of potential proxy variables for the ten largest manufacturing
sectors.
28I estimate industry categories 313 (beverages) and 314 (tobacco) together, as well as 361 (pottery,
china, earthenware) and 362 (glass products), to increase the sample size for the estimation at the
industry level. For the same concern, the production function is not estimated for the industries of 353
(petroleum reneries) and 354 (other petroleum), which have a total of 367 plant-year observations.
25by multinational investors. Accordingly, multinational plants in Turkey are much larger
compared to domestic plants, both in terms of the number of workers they employ and
the value of output they produce. They are also more capital intensive on average and
have much higher value added. Hence, there is a sizable premium to being multinational,
which is well documented in the literature. What remains to be understood, however,
are the determinants of the extent of ownership at multinationals, which I turn to next.
5.2 Match Quality and the Level of Foreign Ownership
This subsection answers two questions that are central to my model: i) What determines
the level of foreign ownership at subsidiaries of multinational rms; and ii) how does
joint productivity aect the level of ownership? Theory suggests that there are two
primary factors that determine the answer to my rst question. The rst is the industry-
level intensity of the production line in headquarter services, , which I refer to as the
\Antras eect." The second is the match-specic joint productivity, , which I call
the \match quality eect." Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) proxy 
by industry-level data on capital- and skill-intensity, respectively, and I compute these
values for the Turkish manufacturing data for its 85 industries dened at the ISIC four
digit level.29 I compute  as described in the previous section and estimate variants of
the following Tobit type one model:
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where i indexes plants, g indexes industries, and t indexes time. In (20), y
it is a latent
variable indicating the optimal level of foreign equity participation, but in the data I
simply observe yit. I assume "  N(0; 2) with variance 2 constant across observations,
and t are year dummies.
Table 4 reports the estimates of the model in (20). In all columns, I report stan-
dardized\beta"coecients, which makes it easy to analyze and compare the size of the
29I conducted the following analysis at the ISIC three-digit level as well, and my results are un-
changed. My analysis with 85 industries is an improvement over Antras (2003), who worked at the
2-digit SIC level with 28 industries, and Yeaple (2006), who worked with 51 industries from BEA
data, but falls short of a similar exercise conducted by Nunn and Tre
er (2008), who work with 370
industries from the US Census data. Unlike these studies, however, I am interested in determining
rm-level outcomes as opposed to the industry-level.
26coecients. To judge the goodness of t for the dierent models, I follow Wooldridge
(2002) and calculate R2 as the square of the correlation coecient between yi and ^ yi,
where ^ yi is the Tobit estimate of E(yjx = xi) with x being the vector of explanatory
variables. The results indicate that match quality is a highly signicant determinant of
the degree of foreign ownership. Joint productivity alone can explain more of the vari-
ation in foreign equity participation as compared to sectoral capital and skill intensity
(see columns (1) and (2)). I nd that while sectoral skill intensity is a signicant deter-
minant of foreign equity participation, sectoral capital intensity is not. Comparing the
sizes of the coecients in column (3) indicates that joint productivity has a larger eect
than industry-level factor intensities. Hence, the \match quality eect" outweighs the
\Antras eect" in determining the degree of integration at multinational subsidiaries.
These ndings are consistent with a high degree of within-industry heterogeneity
in factor use. In their study of intrarm trade using French data, Corcos et al. (2010)
nd factor intensity to be an important determinant of rms' sourcing decisions when
measured at the rm level, but not at the industry level, which they attribute to sub-
stantial within-industry heterogeneity. In order to determine whether match quality
still matters when this heterogeneity is taken into account, I estimate (20) with rm-
level capital and skill intensity. Indeed, columns (4) and (5) show that both variables
are highly signicant determinants of foreign equity participation. I nd that match
quality retains its signicance with an economically large eect even after controlling for
rm-level heterogeneity in factor intensities: a one standard deviation increase in joint
productivity leads to a 0.223 standard deviation increase in foreign equity participation.
One of the major propositions that comes out of my model is that, conditional on
acquisition taking place, the level of foreign ownership is increasing in the joint produc-
tivity of the nal good producer and the manufactured input supplier; i.e. @=@ > 0.
In order to quantify the impact of joint productivity on the level of foreign ownership,
I estimate the pooled Tobit model:
y

it =  + ln()it + K=Lln(K=L)it + S=Lln(S=L)it + 

0Xit + "it; (22)
where y
it is dened by (21) and Xit is a vector of rm-level controls.30 The pooled
30My choice of controls is informed by existing studies which predict the type of foreign ownership
at the plant level (see, for instance, Barbosa and Louri (2002)). It is important to note that there is
a subtle dierence between the determinants of the level of foreign ownership and the determinants of
foreign acquisition per se. Most of the existing literature has focused on the latter, predicting what
factors increase the likelihood of a domestic plant being taken over. The focus of the current study,
however, is on the former, which will not necessarily share the factors that predict acquisition.
27Tobit model has two distinct advantages. First, it does not maintain strict exogeneity
of the explanatory variables; while "it are assumed to be independent of the covariates,
the relationship between the current error term and the covariates in the other time
periods is unspecied. This means that we can safely estimate explanatory variables
that are aected by feedback from previous periods. Second, "it are allowed to be
serially dependent, so that y
it can be dependent after conditioning on the explanatory
variables (Wooldridge, 2002).
Table 5 reports the estimates from the model in (22), which also control for year
and sector eects.31 I report marginal eects conditional on foreign acquisition; i.e.
E(@y=@xj0 < y  100). Column (1) indicates that a 10 percent increase in joint pro-
ductivity is associated with around a 17 percent increase in foreign equity participation
when I do not control for additional covariates. This is an economically signicant eect
and it points to substantial variation in the degree of foreign ownership simply due to
\match quality." When additional covariates are included in columns (2) and (3), the
estimated eect is 18 percent and 14 percent, respectively. These gures show that
multinationals acquire sizable shares of equity at those of their subsidiaries that they
perceive as highly productive partnerships. Controlling for unobserved plant eects in
column (4) does not change the major nding of a positive relationship between joint
productivity and foreign equity participation, although it returns much lower coe-
cients across the board.32
It is possible to have a nonzero correlation between ln()it and "it in (22) if the speci-
cation does not include relevant time-varying factors correlated with TFP, or if TFP is
mismeasured.33 An additional concern is reverse causality, whereby the degree of foreign
31If foreign investors own larger equity fractions in sectors that are more productive than the others,
then failing to control for sector eects might drive the relationship reported in Table 5. Controlling
for sector eects ensures that this relationship is driven by within-industry variation.
32Column (4) reports estimates from a random eects Tobit model to control for unobserved in-
dividual eects since unconditional xed eects estimates are biased as is well known. Controlling
for individual eects comes at a cost, though, because the random eects Tobit estimator requires
strict exogeneity conditional on the unobserved eects. This assumption is unlikely to be satised in
the present context as theory emphasizes the link between rm-specic characteristics and rm-level
outcomes.
33I experimented with three additional methods to check the robustness of my results against the
construction of the TFP measure. First, I used electricity use as a proxy for unobserved productivity
shocks instead of raw materials in the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. Second, I estimated equation (19)
assuming there are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, instead of one. Data on the number of
non-production and production workers are used to represent skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
I estimated the production function with two types of labor rst using electricity usage as a proxy, and
then using raw materials. My results are robust to these alternative methods and they are available
upon request.
28ownership might impact productivity through intrarm activities. An oft mentioned
argument is that equity investment decisions precede physical investment decisions, for
instance if majority foreign ownership is required to transfer technology to the aliate
(Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2006). If such physical investment aects TFP concurrently, then
ln() is potentially endogenous in (22).34 I therefore turn to an instrumental variables
(IV) Tobit model to establish the causal link from joint productivity to the degree of
foreign ownership.
I implement the IV Tobit model in a two-step procedure following Smith and Blun-
dell (1986) and Wooldridge (2002), in which residuals from rst stage estimation are
included in (22) and a standard Tobit is estimated at the second step. I estimate the
rst stage by ordinary least squares including the (log of) price cost-margin (PCM) at
the plant level, which serves as the identifying exclusion restriction. The PCM is cal-
culated as f(value added - total wages)/gross value of productiong for each plant-year
observation. The PCM captures the multinational's marginal costs and price-setting
behavior and thus directly re
ects its market power and protability, which cannot be
accounted for by physical inputs to production. These in turn are positively associated
with rm-level productivity, which renders PCM a good proxy for ln(). In the data,
the simple correlation between (log) PCM and (log) TFP is 0.39. Barbosa and Louri
(2002) nd, using plant level data from Portugal, that PCM does not aect multina-
tionals' ownership preferences, which provides support for the exogeneity condition of
the instrument.
Estimates from the IV Tobit model are reported in columns (5)-(7) of Table 5.35
First stage results indicate that PCM is a highly signicant predictor of joint produc-
tivity; a 10 percent increase in PCM is associated with around a 5 percent increase
in TFP. Accounting for endogeneity does not aect my major ndings and estimates
34While the dierences in the level of productivity between MNEs and domestic rms are well doc-
umented, the evidence from the few studies on whether there is a causal eect of foreign ownership
on productivity is inconclusive. Using data from the British and Italian manufacturing industries,
respectively, Harris and Robinson (2002) and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) nd that foreigners
acquire the most productive plants (cherry-picking) and that foreign ownership has no eect on pro-
ductivity. In contrast, Arnold and Javorcik (2009) nd that foreign acquisitions do lead to productivity
improvements in Indonesian manufacturing, and Aitken and Harrison (1999) nd that foreign equity
participation is positively correlated with plant productivity, as measured by (log) output, in Venezuela.
In a review of the literature, Navaretti and Venables (2004) argue: \... the evidence reported up to
now supports a statistical association between foreign ownership and productivity, but not a causal
link."
35As a robustness check, I estimated the IV Tobit model using maximum likelihood as well. My
results are unchanged using this alternative method.
29at the second stage. Column (5) shows that a 10 percent increase in joint productiv-
ity leads to an 18 percent increase in foreign equity participation. Including further
controls in columns (6) and (7), this estimate becomes 14 percent and 12 percent, re-
spectively. Table 5 additionally reports the results of the Wald test of exogeneity for
the two-step procedure, which indicate that endogeneity is a valid concern except for
column (5). As a result, these estimates point to a robust and economically large eect
of joint productivity on the degree of foreign ownership. Comparing the size of the es-
timates for all covariates, joint productivity is only second to plant size in determining
foreign equity participation. As expected, capital and skill intensity as well as plant
size unambiguously impact the degree of foreign ownership positively.
5.3 Match Quality and Selection
Why does the average degree of foreign ownership rise over time? In the model, multi-
nationals enter a relationship with input suppliers if they receive a high enough produc-
tivity draw and they determine their level of equity participation depending on the noisy
signal on this draw. Because they lock themselves in a long-lasting relationship upon
the resolution of the uncertainty over joint productivity, multinationals choose higher
shares of equity in a high productivity partnership. They are also predicted to increase
their equity share if true productivity turns out to be better than what is implied by
the noisy signal. If, on the other hand, they nd themselves to be in a low productivity
partnership after uncertainty is resolved, then they dissolve the match and engage in
divestment. As low productivity matches dissolve with learning, divestment occurs at
those partnerships with lower levels of foreign equity participation, thus producing the
trend in Figure 3. This subsection tests whether the described selection mechanism is
also at work empirically by using nonparametric and semi-parametric survival analysis.
I dene divestment as constituting any reduction in foreign equity participation
that exceeds 1 percentage point, including cases of plant closure by the multinational
parent.36 A reduction in foreign equity participation means the sale of equity shares
back to the domestic supplier or a third party, which indicates that the multinational
parent is unwilling to commit resources in line with its original stake as it perceives itself
to be in a low productivity match. In the data, the median age (dened as the number
of years that the newly established MNE has operated) of divestment is 3 years. I
36The reason for choosing 1 percent for the denition is to sidestep any coding errors in the data
and to capture the fact that any change in excess of 1 percent can have signicant implications for the
subsidiary, if for instance, the multinational parent decreases its stake from 51 percent to 49 percent.
30start by modeling the\hazard"of divestment by a strictly empirical and nonparametric
approach that leaves out covariates that could aect the hazard rate, which is the well-
known Kaplan-Meier estimator. Let T be the time until divestment occurs and am be
the age of the MNE in year m = 1; :::; M; e.g. a1 is the rst year of production for the
MNE. Then the survivor (no divestment) function at age am is given by:
S(am) = P(T > am) = 
m
r=1P(T > arjT > ar 1) (23)
Now for each r = 1; :::; M, dene Nr to be the number of MNEs in the \risk set"
for interval r. That is, Nr is the number of MNEs that did not engage in divestment
in the time interval [ar 1; ar), so they are subject to the hazard of divestment during
this period (age). Similarly, dene Dr to be the number of MNEs that engaged in
divestment in interval r. A consistent estimator of (23) at age am is then given by
(Wooldridge, 2002):
^ S(am) = 
m
r=1 [(Nr   Dr)=Nr]
The Kaplan-Meier estimator imposes minimal restrictions and assumes that the
probability of divestment depends only on time. In the present context, it highlights
the role that learning over time plays in determining survival/divestment. Figure 6
depicts the evolution of the Kaplan-Meier estimates of divestment. I divide MNEs
into four groups of 25 percentile units according to their average productivity.37 The
gure displays the cumulative probability of divestment by age for the MNEs ranked
by their percentile of productivity. The cumulative divestment functions for the four
groups diverge over time, with the MNEs in the bottom 25th and second 25th percentiles
subject to higher divestment hazard throughout. MNEs in these two groups have around
a one-third probability of divestment beyond age seven. A log-rank test for the equality
of the divestment functions for these four groups returns a 2 value of 13.22 with an
associated p-value of 0.004. When I control for time-invariant sector and/or year eects,
the log-rank test essentially returns a p-value of 0. Coupled with Figure 6, these test
statistics provide strong evidence that low productivity matches dissolve earlier than
high productivity matches.
An important assumption of the Kaplan-Meier estimator is that all MNEs in the
sample behave the same regardless of whether they have engaged in divestment or not.
If those MNEs that experienced no divestment during the sample period behave dier-
ently from those that did, then the Kaplan-Meier estimator may return biased results.
37As a robustness check, I conducted the following nonparametric and semi-parametric analyses
using the initial values of productivity at the MNEs as well. My results are unchanged with this
alternative variable.
31Additionally, there could be other factors that in
uence the probability of divestment,
such as plant size, which are not controlled for in the non-parametric approach. In
order to address these issues, I turn to a Cox proportional hazard model. Cox (1972)
suggests a semi-parametric method of analyzing the impact of covariates on the hazard
rate while handling censored cases (MNEs for which no divestment took place) and




where 0 is the \baseline" hazard, which re
ects individual heterogeneity, and x is a
vector of covariates. Cox's partial likelihood estimator provides consistent estimates of
 without specifying the form and the estimation of 0 individually. Since interest is
on how match quality impacts the probability of divestment, the Cox model provides
the best tradeo between the purely non-parametric model and the more restrictive
parametric models.
Table 6 presents the estimates of the model in (24) with dierent sets of controls.
I report hazard ratios; a ratio above 1.0 means higher odds of divestment and hazard
ratios below 1.0 are associated with decreased hazard of divestment. All estimations are
stratied by sector and year, which allow for equal coecients of the covariates across
these pairings, but generate baseline hazards unique to each stratum. Hence, I guard
against sectoral and economy-wide shocks in a given year that may render the baseline
hazards for these pairs non-proportional.38
I nd strong evidence that lower levels of productivity increase the probability of a
match being dissolved between the multinational parent and its supplier. Columns (1)
and (2) report the estimated eect of an MNE's time-invariant average productivity
on the probability of divestment.39 One unit decrease in average productivity in log
terms is associated with between 35 percent and 27 percent higher hazard of divestment.
Considering that one standard deviation of average productivity is about 1.42 in log
terms, these estimates imply economically large and signicant dierences between the
survival prospects of MNEs that lie at the opposite ends of the productivity distribution.
For instance, using the more conservative estimate from column (2), an MNE at the
38This could be a concern in the Turkish data as Turkey experienced two drastic nancial crises in
1994 and 2001, which were accompanied by devaluation of the Turkish Lira and the contraction of
nominal GDP by almost a quarter in both years.
39Using the time-invariant value of average productivity helps attenuate the yearly idiosyncratic
shocks to TFP and can represent a more accurate estimate of the match-specic joint productivity
that the multinational learns over time.
3225th percentile (lnTFP i =  0:59) is predicted to have about 44 percent higher hazard
of divestment compared to an MNE at the 75th percentile (lnTFP i = 1:05).
In columns (3)-(6), I check whether using a time-variant measure of joint produc-
tivity aects my results. Since the model implies that current levels of productivity
aect subsequent divestment, year-to-year shocks to TFP can potentially in
uence the
estimated hazard. While joint productivity is still highly signicant, a one unit decrease
is now associated with between 20 percent and 14 percent higher hazard of divestment
(columns (3) and (4), respectively). Controlling for rm-level random eects in col-
umn (5) decreases this estimate to 12 percent. The random eects Cox model has the
advantage of accounting for within-rm correlation in the divestment hazard. Column
(6) indicates that with the addition of further controls, rm-level TFP no longer af-
fects the hazard of divestment signicantly. These results suggest that divestment at
MNEs occurs primarily at the cross-section through a process of learning about xed
match quality rather than at a longitudinal level through MNEs reacting to changes
in year-to-year productivity. This is supported by the likelihood ratio tests of shared
frailty in columns (5) and (6), which nd a signicant rm-level frailty eect. Table 6
also shows that a smaller plant size and lower skill intensity at the plant level increase
the probability of divestment. Perhaps surprisingly, capital intensity has no eect on
the prospects of survival, except in column (6). Lastly, the proportional hazard tests
provide strong support for the model specication in all columns, except for column
(6).
6 Conclusion
Using an almost exhaustive database of Turkish manufacturing plants, I conducted a
detailed examination of the degree of vertical integration among multinationals oper-
ating in Turkey and uncovered some empirical regularities that are unknown in the
literature. Motivated by these and earlier ndings, I developed a multi-period model of
foreign direct investment under uncertainty. I showed that there exists a nondegenerate
distribution of foreign ownership in integrated rms regardless of industry and that the
degree of foreign ownership rises over time. The multi-period model developed in this
paper is also able to explain several empirical ndings in the literature and can generate
\cream-skimming." An important point that emerges from the model is that the relative
use of factors in production, and thus the value of intrarm trade, are directly linked to
the level of integration with the parent foreign company. This implies that technology
33transfer within integrated rms is determined by the degree of foreign ownership and
it takes place only gradually via intrarm trade conditional on survival.
My empirical analysis on the relationship between productivity and the degree of
foreign ownership has revealed the importance of within-sector heterogeneity in explain-
ing the distribution of foreign equity participation across plants. I nd that a 10 percent
increase in plant-level TFP is associated with between 12 and 18 percent increase in
foreign equity participation. While factor shares in the production technology are also
important in predicting the degree of foreign ownership, the heterogeneity in plant-level
productivities can better explain the investment decisions of multinationals. I also nd
that MNEs with lower levels of productivity are more likely to engage in divestment. As
a result, my empirical analysis lends support to the selection mechanism described in
the theoretical model. Further empirical analysis of how the degree of foreign ownership
impacts intrarm trade would be most welcome.
34A Appendix
The Appendix contains some intermediate results and proofs of the propositions and
theories that are mentioned in the body of the text.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of two parts. In the rst part of the proof, I show that there exists a
solution  2 (0; 1) to the nal good producer's problem. In the second part, I show that
this optimal level of integration is unique. In order to simplify the analysis, I show these
results for the optimal fraction of revenues that accrue to the nal good producer, 
V.
Recall that V = (1 )+. Since the choice of the level of integration, , uniquely
determines the division rule of the surplus, V, it will be sucient to pin down an
optimal V 2 (0; 1). One can then back out  2 (0; 1) from  = [(
V  )=(1 )]1=.40
Existence:
I rewrite the nal good producer's problem of maximizing per-period prots in terms
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For operating prots to have at least one local maximum V 2 (0; 1), we require
@(V)=@V > 0 as V !  (this is the case when  ! 0) and @(V)=@V < 0
as V ! 1 (this is the case when  ! 1). First consider the case when V ! 1.
The second term in (26) is clearly negative and the rst term converges to zero when
(1 )
1    1 > 0. If
(1 )
1    1 < 0, then the sign of the quadratic equation in V in the
square brackets becomes important as the rst term in the expression tends to innity.
However, notice that the quadratic equation goes to  1 + (1 +    ) as V ! 1.
40Notice also that the rst order condition that denes the optimal level of integration, @()=@ = 0,
can be written as (@(V )=@V )(@V =@) = 0. The partial derivative of V with respect to  is always
non-zero, so that  is dened by @(V )=@V = 0.
35Let g() =  1 + (1 +    ). It is easy to check that g() is increasing in  and
g(0) =  1 and g(1) = 0. Since  takes on values in the open interval (0; 1), g() is
always negative.
Next consider V ! . The second term in the rst order condition vanishes since
 > . The sign of the rst order condition is then determined by the quadratic
expression 2(2   1) + (2(      1)) + (1    + ), which is required to be
positive to show existence. For high enough values of , this expression is positive for
almost all  2 (0; 1). Since I focus on high headquarter intensity industries in this
paper, the existence of  follows without much restriction on .41 For low headquarter
intensity industries, however, the model requires the bargaining power parameter  to
be low enough for vertical integration to arise. In particular, assume  is less than 1
2 for
low headquarter intensity industries; one can check that for  < 1
2,  should also be less
than 1
2 for integration to arise in equilibrium. Figure A1 demonstrates the permissible
set of 's for two industries, one with relatively high headquarter intensity and the
other with relatively low headquarter intensity.
The intuition here comes from the tradeo faced by the nal good producer between
maximizing the level of prots versus maximizing its share of the revenue when it decides
on the level of integration. By picking a higher degree of ownership, the nal good
producer grabs a bigger fraction of the revenue, but causes its manufacturing supplier to
underinvest, which leads to a lower overall level of prots. As the headquarter intensity
of the production line increases, the relative importance of the manufacturing supplier's
input goes down. This means that the supplier's underinvestment has minimal eect
on the overall level of prots when  is high, thereby tilting the nal good producer's
tradeo in favor of a higher share of the revenue.
Notice that the nal good producer always receives at least a fraction  of the rev-
enue. In low  industries, its input is of relatively low importance, so a high bargaining
power  already compensates it for its investment. Any additional increase in the nal
good producer's share of the revenue will lower overall prots. In such industries, one
needs the manufacturing supplier to have the upper hand in the ex post bargaining
stage, i.e. 1    to be high, for vertical integration to occur. In high  industries,
however, the relatively high importance of its input leads the nal good producer to
claim a larger fraction of the revenue even if it has a high bargaining power to start
with. Hence, the permissible set of 's enlarges with headquarter intensity.
Uniqueness:
I now prove that the optimal level of integration is unique. A sucient condition
for this result is that operating prots are strictly quasi-concave in . To get this result,
I again work with V and I show the strict concavity of the prot function in . Note
that V is a strictly concave function of , since V = (1 )+ and  2 (0; 1), and
prots are strictly increasing in V by the model assumptions. Hence, one needs only
to show that prots are concave in V to establish strict concavity in .42
41Only very high values for  may reverse the sign of the quadratic expression in .
42This is relatively easy to see. Let D be a convex set and f : D ! R be strictly concave. Let B
36Since  > , the costs of organizational form in (25) are convex. Subtracting a





1  (V) in (25) is concave in V. The second order condition to
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1  (V) with respect to V.
In order for operating prots to be concave in V, it is sucient for the value of the
cubic equation in V that is expressed in the square brackets to be negative.43 The sign
of this expression is determined by the values of the parameters in the model. In Figure
A2, I plot out the cubic equation for various values of  and . As can be seen from
the gure, the cubic equation is everywhere less than zero whenever  < 1
2, regardless
of what value  takes. When  > 1
2, the curvature of the cubic equation is reversed;
as a result, the value of the equation becomes only slightly positive when evaluated at
the extreme end values of V. This may occur, for instance, when both  and  are
suciently high. However, recall that V is the share of revenue that accrues to the
nal good producer, which has a lower bound of , and 1   V is the share of revenue
that accrues to the manufacturing input supplier. As a result, one can comfortably
conjecture that the value of V in equilibrium will be away from the end points of 0 and
1. This establishes the concavity of the prot function in V. (Recall that  governs
the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within a sector through the CES
function for aggregate consumption.)
contain f(D) and g : B ! R be concave and strictly increasing. Consider any a; b 2 D and t 2 [0; 1].
Let d = ta + (1   t)b. The strict concavity of f means that:
f(d) = f (ta + (1   t)b) > tf(a) + (1   t)f(b)
Then g(f(d)) is strictly concave since:
g (f(d)) > g (tf(a) + (1   t)f(b))  tg (f(a)) + (1   t)g (f(b))
where the rst inequality follows from g being strictly increasing and the second (weak) inequality
from its concavity.
43Note that this is more restrictive than necessary. The second term in (27) is unambiguously
negative since  > . Negativity of the rst term ensures that @2(V )=@2
V < 0. However, the
second order condition could still be negative when the rst term is positive, depending on the relative
sizes of the two terms.
37A.2 Proof of Proposition 2










and V rises monotonically in , it is sucient to sign
the partial derivative @V()=@.
The nal good producer's optimal share of revenues is implicitly dened by the
rst order condition in (26). Dene the function g(V; ) =
@(V )







Notice that @g(V; )=@V is simply the second order condition given by (27). I
show in the proof of Proposition 1 that (27) is negative. Now consider @g(V; )=@.
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V(2   1) + V(2(      1)) + (1    + )

> 0
It is then straightforward to see that
@g(V ;)
@ > 0. Hence, the partial derivative
@V=@ is positive as a result of the implicit function theorem, which establishes that
 is strictly increasing in .
A.3 Proof of () > (~ )
In the body of the paper, I made the assertion that the level of prots required by the
nal good producer to stay in the match rises from the rst period to the second. I
now show formally why this holds.
Using (10) and (11) in equation (15), and adding and subtracting like terms where
necessary, we get:
44To see this result, note that the quadratic term in V in square brackets goes to (V   1)2 as
 ! 1; i.e. for high enough values of headquarter intensity, the quadratic expression is positive.
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()   (~ ) > 0
The last line can be easily seen as the right hand side of the equation is certainly
positive due to the fact that (:) is an increasing function of .
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
I check Blackwell's sucient conditions to establish the existence of an appropriate
operator and show its properties. Let T denote the operator which denes V as the
xed point of the equation (17), so that V = TV .
First, T transforms bounded and continuous functions into other bounded and con-
tinuous functions. Boundedness follows since the prot function in terms of the posterior
expected value of productivity, (~ ), is bounded. To see this, note that from equation
(7), the prot function is bounded from below trivially by the xed cost (when  = 0).
The support of  is (0; 1), but as  rises, Proposition 2 implies that the optimal level
of integration, and thus the nal good producer's share of revenue,V, should also rise.
From (8), one can see that this negates the initial eect on prots from the rise in
. As V tends to 1, operating prots collapse to zero. Continuity follows in a more
straightforward manner as the prot function is continuous in ~ .
Second, consider V (~ )  W(~ ) from the set of bounded and continuous real-valued




























































This establishes the monotonicity of T. For Blackwell's other sucient condition,
we have:





































































































Hence, T is a contraction operator with modulus 1=r which gives us that the func-
tional equation in (17) has a unique xed point in the space of bounded and continuous
functions.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Since the optimal level of integration is strictly increasing in the level of productivity
due to Proposition 2, we need only to show that the average productivity in the second
period is greater than in the rst period. The rest of the proof closely follows Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2004).
The mean values of productivity in period 1 and in period 2 are calculated using
Bayes rule. The probability that a previously unmatched multinational oers a contract
to its supplier in the rst period is given by
 1
~  dG(~ j^ 
; ^ b). The probability that a
40previously unmatched multinational oers a contract in the rst period and updates
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Thus, average productivity rises over time which leads to a greater degree of foreign
ownership at the average integrated rm.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
In the text.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
In the text.
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43Table 1: Presence of Multinationals in Turkish Manufacturing
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No. of MNEs 251 264 277 282 308 338 353 343 341
Total No. of Plants 5,682 5,982 6,466 6,888 7,322 7,855 7,557 7,385 6,950
MNE Presence (%) 4.42 4.41 4.28 4.09 4.21 4.30 4.67 4.64 4.91
(a) Multinational Presence by Year
Plant-Year Obs: MNE Presence:
ISIC Code Sector MNE Total (%)
311 Food 235 6,764 3.47
312 Other Food 116 1,978 5.86
313 Beverage 43 657 6.54
314 Tobacco 53 217 24.42
321 Textiles 175 10,605 1.65
322 Wearing Apparel 199 7,040 2.83
323 Leather 1 787 0.13
324 Footwear 3 693 0.43
331 Wood Products 10 1,128 0.89
332 Furniture 7 935 0.75
341 Paper Products 36 1,009 3.57
342 Printing and Publishing 11 1,166 0.94
351 Industrial Chemicals 74 602 12.29
352 Other Chemicals 294 1,831 16.06
353 Petroleum Reneries 8 63 12.70
354 Other Petroleum 67 229 29.26
355 Rubber Products 54 812 6.65
356 Other Plastic Products 103 2,564 4.02
361 Pottery, China, Earthenware 11 278 3.96
362 Glass Products 43 524 8.21
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 156 3,649 4.28
371 Iron and Steel 46 1,697 2.71
372 Non-ferrous Metal 23 728 3.16
381 Fabricated Metal Products 147 5,032 2.92
382 Non-electrical Machinery 175 4,158 4.21
383 Electrical Machinery 285 2,809 10.15
384 Transport Equipment 293 2,821 10.39
385 Scientic and Optical Equipment 48 628 7.64
390 Other Manufacturing 41 683 6.00
(b) Multinational Presence by Sector
Notes: An MNE is dened as a plant with any level of foreign ownership share. MNE presence
is the ratio of the number of MNE observations to the total number of observations. Industry
classication follows the International Standard Industry Classication System (ISIC) Rev.2
at the 3-digit level.
44Table 2: Summary Statistics on Firm-Level Variables
Obs Mean Std Dev
Intra-sector
Std Dev (%)
TFP 58,845 -0.631 1.247 0.828
Capital Intensity 59,137 -1.082 1.676 0.973
Skill Intensity 54,248 -1.557 0.954 0.909
Employment 59,127 4.010 1.119 0.971











Capital Intensity -0.075 1.000
Skill Intensity 0.115 0.165 1.000
Employment 0.272 0.114 0.049 1.000
Electric Use 0.053 0.340 0.101 0.209 1.000
(b) Correlations Across Firm-Level Variables
Notes: All variables are in logs. Intra-sector Std Dev (%) refers, for each variable, to the ratio
between the mean standard deviation within ISIC 3-digit sectors and the overall standard
deviation. The calculation of TFP estimates are described in the text. Capital Intensity is
the ratio of the stock of capital to employment in any given year. Skill Intensity is the ratio of
non-production workers to production workers. Employment is the average number of workers
at a plant over a given year. Electric Use is the yearly consumption of electricity per worker.
Capital Intensity and Electric Use are in billions of Turkish Liras and de
ated by 1990 prices.
45Table 3: Summary Statistics (Means) by Year and Ownership






1993 4.7 419.0 2167.4 1018.1 2.4
1994 5.0 380.2 1698.8 792.0 2.6
1995 4.6 368.3 2007.2 896.1 2.5
1996 5.4 397.8 2051.3 933.8 2.7
1997 4.1 392.6 2175.8 1013.3 2.9
1998 6.0 369.4 1944.0 840.9 2.8
1999 6.2 352.3 1907.0 856.3 2.8
2000 5.7 371.5 2269.9 927.4 2.9
2001 5.9 378.8 2207.1 948.1 3.1
Domestic Plants
1993 1.4 126.2 299.2 127.3 1.7
1994 1.3 117.2 272.0 112.3 1.7
1995 1.2 114.8 283.7 110.1 1.6
1996 1.2 116.3 270.9 101.4 1.7
1997 1.2 118.0 294.2 113.6 1.5
1998 1.2 115.4 282.0 110.0 1.6
1999 1.4 112.4 282.2 109.4 1.8
2000 1.4 114.7 298.4 106.0 1.5
2001 1.4 113.7 301.3 109.4 1.5
Notes: An MNE is dened as a plant with any level of foreign ownership share. Employment
is the average number of workers at a plant over a given year. Output and Value Added are
dened as in the text and in Data Appendix. Capital Intensity is the ratio of the stock of
capital to employment in any given year. Output, Value Added, and Capital Intensity are in
billions of Turkish Liras and de
ated by 1990 prices. The calculation of TFP estimates are
described in the text.
46Table 4: The Determinants of the Level of Foreign Ownership, Sector- and
Firm-Level Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

































Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 lnL 20,178 20,660 19,895 19,702 19,016
^  157.316 159.725 153.120 148.876 143.284
R2 0.031 0.019 0.033 0.053 0.079
Observations 58,845 59,137 58,845 54,248 53,966
Notes: This table reports estimates of (20). Standardized\beta"coecients are reported; ro-
bust standard errors for the marginal eects after Tobit are given in parentheses and clustered
at the sector level in column (2) and at the rm level in the remaining columns; *, **, *** in-
dicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Sector- and Firm-Level Capital
and Skill Intensity measures are dened at the ISIC 4-digit level. Variable denitions and the
calculation of R2 are described in the text.  lnL is the negative of the log pseudolikelihood
and ^  is the estimated standard error of the tted model.
47Table 5: Tobit Results for the Eect of Joint Productivity on the Level of Foreign Ownership
Tobit RE Tobit IV Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




















































Model Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
 lnL 19,364 18,438 17,994 13,060 14,925 14,199 13,874
^  146.159 135.031 129.700 144.419 132.426 127.473
Wald Test (p-value) 0.652 0.001 0.045
First Stage








R2 0.538 0.590 0.666
Observations 58,845 53,966 53,917 53,917 44,826 41,001 40,972
Notes: This table reports estimates of (22). Marginal eects conditional on foreign acquisition are reported, except for the rst
stage in IV Tobit. Model eects include year and sector eects in all columns, and additionally unobserved eects in column (4).
 lnL is the negative of the log likelihood of the tted model and ^  is the estimated standard error of the tted model. Wald
Test is the test of exogeneity for two-step IV Tobit, p-value reported (see Wooldridge (2002)). Variable denitions and sources are
described in the text. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, clustered at the rm level. Coecients are given in
the rst line; standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
4
8Table 6: Cox Regression Results for the Hazard of Divestment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Hazard Rate of Divestment



































Model Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shared Frailty Yes Yes
 lnL 865.087 832.313 832.153 796.620 2,398.292 2,322.029




















Observations 2,674 2,649 2,593 2,572 2,593 2,572
Notes: This table reports estimates of (24). Model eects control for sector and year eects in all columns. Shared frailty
controls for rm-level eects. Hazard ratios are given in the rst line; robust standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate
signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Variable denitions are in the text.  lnL is the negative of the log
likelihood, and LR test of Shared Frailty tests for the existence of a signicant rm-level frailty eect.
4
9Figure 1: Distribution of Foreign Ownership in the Pooled Sample





51Figure 3: Average Degree of Foreign Ownership by Age
52Figure 4: Operating Prots and the Level of Integration
(a) Dierent Headquarter Intensities
Notes: This gure simulates the behavior of the operating prots function in (7) for dierent
values of headquarter intensity, . The parameter values used in the simulation are:  = 0:1,
 = 0:75,  = 0:4,  = 30, X = 10,  = 0:8, wN = 1:1, and wS = 1.
(b) Dierent Match Qualities
Notes: This gure simulates the behavior of the operating prots function in (7) for dierent
values of the match quality, . The parameter values used in the simulation are:  = 0:1,
 = 0:7,  = 0:4,  = 0:7, X = 10,  = 0:8, wN = 1:1, and wS = 1.
53Figure 5: Optimal Policy in Period 2
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier Divestment Plot of MNEs by Level of Joint
Productivity
Notes: This gure plots the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the divestment probabilities for multi-
nationals in the Turkish manufacturing industry, 1993-2001, stratied by percentile rank of
their mean total factor productivity (TFP) while under foreign ownership. Divestment is
dened as any decrease in foreign equity participation exceeding one percent or complete
shutdown of the multinational plant. The calculation of TFP estimates are described in the
text.
54Figure A1: The Permissible Set of 's for Various Headquarter Intensities
Figure A2: The Sign of the Cubic Equation in V for Dierent Parameter
Values
55B Data Appendix
In this section, I detail the construction of the variables used in the paper and the
procedure followed to clean the data. Note that all variables in the data set are measured
in 1990 prices (Turkish Liras). All data come from the Turkish Statistical Institute's
Industrial Analysis Database unless stated otherwise.
Output is measured as the sum of the revenues from annual sales of the plant's nal
goods, revenues from contract manufacturing, and the change in inventories of nal
goods from year start to year end. I de
ate output by the relevant three-digit output
price de
ator. Material inputs are measured as the sum of all intermediate inputs,
except for fuel and electricity, and the change in inventories of material inputs from
year start to year end. I de
ate material inputs by the relevant three-digit input price
de
ator. Electricity is calculated as the sum of the value of electricity purchased and
produced in-house minus the value electricity sold. Both electricity and fuel are de
ated
by their own price de
ators. Labor is measured as the number of paid workers of the
plant in a given year. This is reported for production and non-production workers four
times during a given year (in February, May, August, and November) and the average
of these four observations constitutes the average number of workers at the plant in a
given year (i.e. the plant size).
Capital stock information is not reported in the database, so I calculate it using the
reported investment data. The database includes information on investment in machin-
ery and equipment, building and structures, transportation equipment, and computer
and programming. All series are available since 1990, except for computer and pro-
gramming, which is available since 1995. Since the disaggregated investment de
ator
is not available, I use the aggregate investment de
ator to de
ate all series. I use the
perpetual inventory method in constructing the yearly capital stock for each of these
series at the plant level.
Since initial capital stock is not reported, I impute it by assuming that plants are on
their balanced growth path. I assume that capital stock is predetermined and evolves
according to:
Kt+1 = (1   )Kt + It (28)
as current investment, reacting to realized productivity shocks, takes one period before
it becomes productive. If plants are on their balanced growth path, then K1=K0 =
Y1=Y0 = 1+g0;1, where g0;1 is the initial output growth of the plant. It is then easy to
show that initial capital stock is given by: K0 = I0=(g0;1 + ). After calculating K0, I
apply the perpetual inventory method to construct the capital stock series implied by
(28). I use depreciation rates of 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% for building and structures,
machinery and equipment, transportation equipment, and computer and programming,
respectively. I observe zero initial investment for a small number of plants, for which I
56calculate initial capital stock at the year that they rst report positive investment and
then iterate back by dividing capital stock by (1   ) each year.
After calculating the capital stock series separately for machinery and equipment,
building and structures, transportation equipment, and computer and programming, I
aggregate the series to form the total capital stock series of the plant. The database
provides information on imported machinery capital, and I follow the same approach
outlined here to calculate these series.
Table B1 reports the number of MNEs and the total number of plants in the database
before the cleaning procedure. I follow three rules to clean the data. First, plants
that have \gaps" in the sample period are excluded from the analysis. Second, those
observations which have a non-positive value for capital stock are excluded as well.
Lastly, I exclude the outlier observations which could distort inference following the
construction of the TFP measure by dropping the top 1 percent of the sample for which
productivity is computed.








1993 301 10,567 2.85
1994 312 10,127 3.08
1995 325 10,229 3.18
1996 326 10,590 3.08
1997 362 11,365 3.19
1998 416 12,321 3.38
1999 406 11,262 3.61
2000 414 11,114 3.73
2001 439 11,311 3.88
Table B2: Percent of non-zero observations
ISIC Sector Investment Fuels Materials Electricity
311 Food 56.8 84.4 100 99.9
312 Other Food 49.3 85.3 100 99.9
321 Textiles 63.9 71.9 99.8 99.9
322 Wearing Apparel 60.8 64.6 99.6 99.9
356 Other Plastic Products 69.9 62.3 100 100
369 Non-metallic Mineral Products 56.9 88.0 99.9 99.8
381 Fabricated Metal Products 63.0 72.9 99.9 99.9
382 Non-electrical Machinery 63.5 70.9 100 99.9
383 Electrical Machinery 69.5 77.2 99.9 99.7
384 Transport Equipment 67.4 74.8 100 99.9
58Table B3: Levinsohn-Petrin Estimates of the Production Function,
1993-2001.
ISIC Sector Labor Capital N
Coe. S.E. Coe. S.E.
311 Food .893 .029 .359 .075 6448
312 Other Food .845 .047 .190 .113 1853
313, 314 Beverage and Tobacco .894 .090 .098 .177 830
321 Textiles .809 .023 .193 .042 10293
322 Wearing Apparel .754 .036 .075 .102 6762
323 Leather .884 .098 .191 .081 708
324 Footwear 1.022 .083 .226 .096 683
331 Wood Products .851 .079 .011 .101 1074
332 Furniture .964 .064 .292 .110 905
341 Paper Products .826 .085 .265 .201 975
342 Printing and Publishing .613 .103 .328 .156 1117
351 Industrial Chemicals .698 .153 .419 .128 563
352 Other Chemicals .950 .063 .262 .118 1767
355 Rubber Products .952 .103 .545 .185 789
356 Other Plastic Products .944 .071 .367 .081 2432
361, 362 Pottery, China, and Glass Prod. .810 .098 .339 .176 778
369 Non-metallic Mineral Prod. .932 .048 .937 .091 3558
371 Iron and Steel .873 .070 .159 .107 1556
372 Non-ferrous Metal .878 .104 .402 .195 683
381 Fabricated Metal Products .910 .034 .337 .054 4870
382 Non-electrical Machinery .948 .045 .204 .047 3990
383 Electrical Machinery .898 .051 .148 .102 2734
384 Transport Equipment .826 .050 .164 .093 2741
385 Scientic and Optical Equipment .728 .108 .413 .220 613
390 Other Manufacturing 1.008 .109 .441 .180 665
59